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Abstract: 
This paper attempts to combine elements of the approaches of two influential 
economists, Sheila Dow and Deirdre McCloskey and expands on previous work 
(2005) on Dow’s concept of dualism. A concept of rhetorical dualism is developed: 
dualism (defined variously) engaged in for a rhetorical purpose. It is argued by way 
of example case studies that rhetorical dualism is a significant feature of economics 
and that several influential authors have engaged in it. Further rhetorical dualism is 
shown to be prevalent in the current orthodox/heterodox distinction, and in the 
arguments of heterodox economists; but also that this distinction and type of 
distinction are unhelpful. 
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Many  of  the  recent  developments  in  economics  have  concerned  pluralism.  This  has 
occurred at various levels and involved numerous groups. At one level, philosophers of 
economics have laboured over what pluralism is (Mäki, 1997; Dow, 1997; Salanti and 
Screpanti, 1997; Caldwell, 1982). This work has generated a plurality of definitions of 
pluralism;  this  may  or  may  not  be  a  helpful  development.  Also,  so-called  orthodox 
economists have claimed that in terms of theory, method and empirics, they are – and in 
some cases they have been – becoming more pluralistic (see Colander, 2000). Of course, 
so-called heterodox economists have argued that in fact the orthodoxy has become more 
entrenched  in  its  positions  and  has  even  acted  to  reduce  pluralism  (Lee  and  Harley, 
1998). Such claims by the minority position are not new; indeed, a consistent claim by 
heterodox economists has been that good ‘heterodox’ principles, such as the importance 
of  time,  history,  uncertainty  and  agency,  have  been  appropriated  and  neutered  by 
orthodox  economists  (the  debate  over  the  real  Keynes  providing  perhaps  the  best 
examples of such claims). In addition to such debates between orthodox and heterodox, 
there have also emerged views that the orthodox/heterodox distinction is unhelpful (e.g. 
Garnett, 2005; Sent, 2003; Davis, 2003; Dow 2000).  
 
This paper will return to that last question towards its conclusion. For now, I should like 
to claim that the debates above could be viewed as being, in part, about how economists 
think and argue. This opinion is based partly on the observation that simultaneous with 
the debates above, two  literatures have developed which help us understand the way 
economists think and argue, and therefore help us explain the debates over pluralism. 
One is the work developed by Sheila Dow on the prevalent tendency in thought towards 
dualism (Dow, 1990, 1995, 1997, 2002, 2004, 2005; Chick and Dow, 2001, 2002; see 
also  Mearman,  2005).  Dow  points  out  the  pitfalls  of  thinking  in  fixed  ‘either/or’ 
categories. Significantly, she has argued for pluralism, but for one of a specific type, 
which is structured and allows room for schools of thought to persist. The second body of 
work is that, associated primarily with Deirdre McCloskey, on the rhetoric of economics 
(see McCloskey, 1983, 1985, 1994, 1998; Ziliak and McCloskey, 2004). That literature 
cautions economists to be more aware of how they converse and the language they use. 
The rhetoric literature has been accompanied by a focus on the language of economics 
(see for example, Henderson, Dudley-Evans and Backhouse, 1993).  
 
This paper aims to perform a type of synthesis of these literatures into a concept of 
rhetorical dualism. Rhetorical dualism is: the creation of dualistic categories for a 
rhetorical purpose. The concept as developed here is a combination of Dow's concept of 
dualism and McCloskey's concept of rhetoric. The paper suggests that rhetorical dualism 
is common in economics. Here, we briefly consider the debate between Monetarists and 
                                                 
1 This work was partly completed at the University of Amsterdam, where I was a visiting research fellow in 
March 2006. I acknowledge their assistance. I also acknowledge comments received at a staff seminar at 
UWE in November, 2006 and at the conference of the International Confederation of Associations for 
Pluralism in Economics in Salt Lake City, in June 2007. The usual disclaimer applies.    2 
Keynesians as outlined in Johnson (1971). The paper argues that rhetorical dualism is 
present there. That finding supports conclusions in Backhouse (1993) and Dudley-Evans 
(1993) who analyse the language used in the debate over the quantity theory of money 
between Friedman and his critics. The paper then examines the contemporary question of 
the orthodoxy/heterodoxy distinction. That distinction is shown to be problematic in 
some ways, such that perhaps it should be abandoned. 
 




Elsewhere, Mearman (2005) has developed Dow’s (1990) work on dualism. For Dow, 
dualism is “…the [1] propensity to classify [2] concepts, statements and events according 
to duals, as [3] belonging to only one of [4] two [5] all-encompassing, [6] mutually-
exclusive categories with [7] fixed meanings: true or false, logical or illogical, positive or 
normative,  fact  or  opinion,  and  so  on”  (Dow,  1985:  14;  1996:  16-17).  Based  on  an 
analysis  of  Dow’s  work,  Mearman  argues  that  in  fact,  dualism  as  originally  defined 
(dualism1)  is  extremely  rare  and  practically  irrelevant.  Rather,  Mearman  argued  that 
Dow’s concept of dualism applies best to a situation, which he terms dualism2, in which 
there are polar concepts, or in which a continuum of concepts can be found. This can be 
illustrated by Figure 1 below.  
 
Figure 1: DUALISM2 
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In both cases, a (solid) line connecting all the points between the end points X and Y can 
be imagined. Mearman argues that the act of dualism to which Dow refers (dualism2) 
involves the imposition of a fault line at some point on the line (at Z) between the end 
points. Thence, all points to the left of this fault line are treated as equivalent to the left 
pole (i.e. all points to the left of Z are treated as X); all points to the right are treated as 
equivalent to the right pole (all points right of Z are treated as Y). Thus, if “rational” and 
“irrational” were two polar extremes, the act of dualism would be to impose some point, 
to the left of which all behaviour would be considered completely rational and to the right 
of which, completely irrational. There would be no possibility of bounded rationality, for 
example.   
 
It  should  be  noted  further  that  the  principle  of  dualism  could  apply  equally  to  n 
categories, i.e. a plurality. Thus, a seemingly pluralistic formulation can be dualistic in 
the same way as described above, except that the number of categories is n. Thus, in 
Figure 2 below, we have n categories, A,…,n, lying along a continuum. A, M and Z, are 
three stations along the continuum. A, M and Z act as attractors, such that fault lines at i   3 
and j, have the same effect as above. Points to the left of i become equivalent to A, points 
to the right become equivalent to M. The logic is the same as above.  
 
Figure 2: Pluralism as dualism2 
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Dow  argues  that  such  dualistic  thought  can  be  damaging  for  economics.  This  is 
particularly so when the categories get fixed and thought becomes inflexible. Clearly, it is 
often desirable and sometimes necessary that categories must be fixed for a short time in 
order  for  analysis  to  proceed.  Fundamentally,  it  is  epistemologically  necessary that  a 
thing be identifiable and placed in a category, which remains fixed for the initial period 
of analysis. Analysis would be impossible without this step
2. It may be inevitable that 
concepts develop dualistically. To define an unfamiliar object in terms of the familiar is 
clearly  a  common  (general)  dialectical  technique.  However,  how  this  is  done  is 
significant, as follows. Often a dualist2 process occurs. The unfamiliar is defined in terms 
of the familiar by placing it in opposition to it. Often the similarities between the two are 
ignored. For example, one might define irrationality in terms of rationality, excluding 
intermediate concepts. Indeed, this is the central point of Dow’s work: that dualism leads 
to errors. Further, if the categories get fixed for too long and/or objects cannot move 
between fixed categories, this can inhibit change in theoretical knowledge. Rather, Dow 
advocates a  dynamic  approach  in which  categories  (and  therefore  classifications)  can 
only be fixed temporarily, categories can change and perhaps combine with each other. 
One example she uses is the (dialectical) process of synthesis.  
 
Dualities, i.e., pairs, then, can be epistemologically necessary. However, another reason 
Dow  objects  to  dualism  as  a  mode  of  thought  is  because  the  ontological  (and 
epistemological)  conditions  it  requires  often  do  not  hold.  For  example,  the  mutual 
exclusivity of categories makes assumptions about the relationality of objects which may 
imply  atomism.  The  fixity  of  categories  implies  unchanging  entities  and  relations 
between them. The identification of categories may imply a level of certainty which is 
unwarranted  (see  Dow,  1990  for  more  detail).  Of  course,  this  is  not  to  say  that  all 
dualities are invalid. One cannot be slightly pregnant. It is also now possible to make 
extremely confident, near infallible, judgements about whether a woman is pregnant or 
not. Thus, in terms of the categories involved and identifying whether an entity fits into a 
category, some dualities are unproblematic. However, if the world is complex (implying 
high  numbers  of  emergent  entities  arranged  into  diverse  networks  with  a  variety  of 
relations between entities), then theories are highly fallible, knowledge is uncertain and 
all categories should be provisional. In that light, while dualities can be epistemologically 
                                                 
2 Colander (2000) argues that categories must be fixed for them to be useful. That implies that dualism in 
Dow’s sense is in one sense desirable. However, he also goes to argue that some terms may be fixed for too 
long. He cites the example of neo-classical economics, which he claims changed considerably, yet the 
category defining it did not.   4 
necessary  and  sometimes  ontologically  licensed,  dualism  as  a  mode  of  thought  is 
problematic, and often the creation of dualistic categories is dangerous. The same applies 
to the level of abstraction adopted by a theorist. This paper now goes on to argue that 




Part of the recent surge in methodology has been the literature on rhetoric. This literature 
is principally associated with McCloskey (1983, 1994, 1998) and Klamer (Klamer, 1982; 
see also Klamer, McCloskey and Solow, 1988), although some of the implications and 
techniques have been taken up by other writers. For example, the method of interviewing 
economists and publishing these conversations has been adopted by Harcourt and King 
(1995), King (1995), Dunn (2002) and Colander, Holt and Rosser (2004a). The rhetoric 
literature embraces many of the themes of the philosophical tradition of postmodernism 
(for  a  commentary,  see  Sarup,  1993).  It  attacks  the  modernist/positivist,  Cartesian 
“Received View” and prescriptivist Methodology (e.g. Blaug 1980) in general. It argues 
that the official methodology of economics, based on objectivism, hypothesis testing and 
falsification is not the one actually followed by economists; and moreover, that that is a 
good thing, because it is not the one followed by science defined more broadly. For 
example, as Ziliak and McCloskey (2004) argue, statistical testing has an arbitrary basis 
and  often reaches  meaningless  conclusions.  Further,  rather  than  rejecting  theories  for 
which contradictory evidence has been found, economists believe theories with much 
greater  tenacity  than  is  justified  by  the  evidence:  marginalism  is  one  example;  the 
neutrality of money, another. 
 
Instead,  economists  use  tricks  of  style,  code  words,  appeals  to  authority; 
naturalistic/physical metaphors, including  the  metaphor of  mathematics;  metaphors  of 
war, battle, games; appeals to aesthetics  (e.g. simplicity); and appeals  to expertise in 
mathematics. Their arguments are informed by strong prior beliefs, and, contrary to the 
strict fact/value distinction adopted in positivism, moral positions too. This process is 
facilitated by the formation of interest groups (of which there are many examples). Above 
all, arguments are designed to be (non-coercively) persuasive; and in order to do this; 
economists attempt to tell convincing stories, to use persuasive narrative. And if the story 
is not convincing enough initially, economists change tack and attempt to persuade in a 
different way. These are the techniques of conversation; and economists are engaged in a 
conversation  with  other  economists  (and  others).  Persuasiveness  explains  why  some 
methods and theories become dominant; they win particular language games. 
 
Overall, therefore, the rhetoric approach invites economics to be viewed in a different 
way. In many ways, economics becomes more attractive, lively and interesting, removed 
from its scientistic straitjacket. However, this does not mean that economics descends 
into chaos; the rhetoric of economics is the rules of disciplined conversation. It is more 
than “mere rhetoric”; rather it involves probing what people think they (ought to) believe; 
finding good reasons/grounds for belief; and honest argument to an audience. McCloskey 
and others argue that an appreciation of rhetoric will create better conversation, greater 
tolerance and better understanding of disagreement.    5 
 
There are of course critics of the rhetoric literature. Mirowski (1987) is a good example. 
One  question  concerns  the  definition  of  rhetoric.  McCloskey  (1994)  has  argued  that 
rhetoric is a complex object, like science, which defies simple explanation. However, 
operationally that can be problematic. For instance, we know that rhetoric is held to be 
more than ‘mere rhetoric’, and that implicitly the distinction between rhetoric and truth is 
rejected:  rhetoric  is  not  lying  and  not  just  ‘spin’.  Indeed,  McCloskey  embraces  the 
Habermasian  concept  of  Sprachethik,  requiring  that  argument  follow  certain  rules  of 
engagement,  including  honesty.  But  does  that  imply  that  all  speech  and  writing  is 
rhetoric?  
 
The  picture  is  slightly  unclear.  McCloskey  writes:  “No  speech  with  intent  is 
‘nonrhetorical’. Rhetoric is not everything, but it is everywhere in the speech of human 
persuaders” (1998: 8). Further: “In other words, rhetoric is speech with an audience. All 
speech  that intends to  persuade  is  rhetorical,  from  higher  math  to lower  advertising” 
(1994: 51). She also claims (1994: 78) that while 100% of the value added of lawyers and 
PR people is based on persuasion, only 25% of the value added of those working in 
natural sciences is attributable to persuasion. However, given that rhetoric “is the whole 
art of argument” (1994: 35) and that this includes the range of techniques and evidence, it 
is  hard  to  fathom  why  only  25%  of  what  natural  scientists  do  is  persuasive.  So, 
McCloskey’s definitions suggest that rhetoric may include all written and spoken work 
by the scientist. However, McCloskey’s quantitative estimates suggest that this is not the 
case. 
 
Given this ambiguity, it may be possible to argue that there is some distinction between 
rhetorical (for persuasion) and speech/writing constructed for the purpose of working out: 
that might be called analytical or perhaps heuristic. That would suggest that if a position 
is established in an argument, it could have one of two (or both) purposes: to persuade, or 
to think through a problem. Thus, the use of mathematics is rhetorical in its power and 
prestige, but it may also be used as in Marshall, to work out a question abstractly (at 
which point, presumably, it is burnt). In neither case is it necessary that the scientist 
believes the categories to be true in the sense of corresponding with any real object or 
group;  it  is  not  even the  case  that  they  believe  the  categories  might exist. However, 
neither is it the case that in rhetorical arguments, the categories or concepts used are 
necessarily false
3. Rather the key distinction is the purpose of the category or concept: in 
one case, it may be rhetorical, and in the other it may be heuristic. That raises the further 
question of intentionality. As noted above, McCloskey (passim) holds that rhetoric is 
speech with intent [to persuade]. However, is this intentionality always conscious? For 
example, it is possible that the dualism is almost accidental: if Dow is correct that modern 
thought has tended to be dualist, people might be viewed as being trapped in a Cartesian 
mindset,  unable  to  escape  and  merely  prone  to  thinking  dualistically.  Therefore, 
                                                 
3 This of course raises another question about rhetoric: its relation to realism. The postmodernist roots of 
rhetoric suggest an anti-realism; but it is possible to reconcile rhetoric and realism (see Mäki, 1988); 
indeed, as Peter’s (2001) discussion notes, McCloskey acknowledges an ontological realism, i.e. that the 
world is ‘out there’ (McCloskey, 1994: 200). However, while for realists such as Mäki and Tony Lawson, 
ontological realism matters for economic rhetoric, for McCloskey it does not.   6 
unconscious  motives  or  beliefs  are  causally  relevant  in  explaining  the  source  of  the 
rhetorical dualism, and thus should be considered. 
 
2.3 Rhetorical dualism 
 
The literature on rhetoric and the work on dualism can be combined into the concept of 
rhetorical dualism: dualism for rhetorical purposes
4. The dualism can be of any of the 
types  discussed  above.  So,  for  example,  the  collapsing  of  polar  concepts  into  two 
mutually exclusive categories (dualism2) might be for rhetorical reasons. Thus, in this 
context it is important to note the scenario in which a dualism2 is occurring and one or 
both  of  the  polar  concepts  are  knowingly  false.  That  is,  the  theorist  knows  that  the 
category captures no real entity, or possible entity. If this was done (or at least interpreted 
as such) for rhetorical reasons, it can also be described as rhetorical dualism. 
 
Therefore, when a politician attempts to exaggerate the position of an opponent, or a 
prosecution  lawyer  tries  to  convince  the  jury  that  a  witness  is,  based  on  small 
indiscretions or untruths, in fact a bare-faced liar, this is a form of rhetorical dualism. In 
the  first  case,  the  purpose  of  doing  so is to  emphasise  that  the  politician  has  a  very 
different  view.  Or  it  can  be  to  show  that  the  politician  adopts  moderate  positions, 
compared to his/her extremist opponent. Another case would be that in which a politician 
aims to push out the boundary of the other’s definition in order to create space in the 
middle for him or herself. The process of this form of dualism, called here dualism2a, is 
illustrated in Figure 3 below. Here, the rhetorical act has two parts: i) the continuum of 
concepts  between  X  and  Y  is  split  by  the  fault  line  Z;  and  ii)  the  true  point  X  is 
transformed into a false version of it, X’, which becomes the new pole.  
 
Figure 3: Dualism2a 
 
X’    (X)              Y 
 
  (Z=X’)        (Z=Y) 
        Z 
 
Often  rhetorical  dualism  might  take  place  via  the  choice  of  a  level  of  abstraction. 
Specifically, where at one level of abstraction there are many categories, it is possible to 
choose  a  level  of  abstraction  which  creates  two  categories  only.  For  example,  it  is 
possible within economics to identify the following levels: theory, schools of thought, 
and worldview. Clearly to group theories into schools of thought is an act of abstraction 
from the differences between the theories to claim that they have a common essence. This 
process (simplified) is displayed in Figure 4. Here we observe the three levels, theory, 
school  and  meta-level.  The  meta-level  may  be  ontological,  epistemological, 
methodological, and even ethical. In each case, there is a continuum of possibilities. It 
may also be, as above, that the continuum represents a polarity, although in this particular 
                                                 
4 Mehta (1993) identifies the use of dualist language in debates over bargaining. Specifically she identifies 
use of language such ‘friends’ and ‘non-friends’. However, this is not formalised or generalised to “’x’-
‘non-x’” language as Dow does, or as proposed here.    7 
case, that is less likely. Let us consider the theory level first. In each case, the continuum 
is interrupted by a fault line, and the process of dualism is continued as above in Figures 
1 and 2. Thus, theories A and B are collapsed into each other in school I, etc. At level 2, 
there is a pluralism of schools, but that pluralism remains a dualistic process, as explained 
in figure 3. Finally at level 3, differences between schools of thought I and J, and K and 
L,  respectively  are  collapsed  into  meta-categories  M  and  N;  whereas  the  differences 
between J and K, which previously were small, have been accentuated.  
 
 
Figure 4: rhetorical dualism via level of abstraction 
 
Level 1: theory  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H 
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This manoeuvre can be useful in thought – and can lead to or even constitute genuine 
insight – but can also be questionable. Clearly, to claim that theories A…D can be placed 
in the meta-level category M (and likewise E…H are grouped into N) abstracts from what 
may be some significant similarities between theories and schools of thought on different 
sides  of  the  claimed  divide,  as  well  as  differences  between  theories  and  schools  of 
thought on the same sides. For instance, though theories D and E are adjacent in the 
theoretical  continuum  and  therefore  similar  in  many  ways,  but  can  be  placed  into 
different  schools  of  thought  and  on  different  sides  of  the  fault  line  at  level  3;  and 
therefore they are considered fundamentally different. Arguably both Lawson (1997) and 
Potts (2000) go further, to choose a level of abstraction from actual schools of thought 
which  highlights  a  specific  ontological  feature  –  closed  vs.  open  systems;  and 
integral/non-integral space respectively – to claim that economics can be split down the 
middle into two highly distinct approaches. Such an abstraction allows both authors to 
make larger claims about the impact and importance of their own contribution. Again, 
that is not to claim that the authors were (either solely, or indeed at all) motivated by that 
consideration; but that the effect has been such.  
 
It would be useful at this point to recapitulate. Dualism is a tendency in thought. It can 
take  different  forms.  For  example,  we  might  find:  1)  dualism1:  the  segregation  of  n 
categories  into  two  mutually  exclusive,  exhaustive,  fixed  categories,  or  simply  the 
tendency to think in terms of those two; 2) dualism2: the use of a fault line and treatment 
of  end  points  as  attracting  poles,  in  order  to  achieve  the  same  effect  as  in  (1);  3) 
dualism2a, which is identical to (2) except that at least one of the poles is false; 4) the 
choice  of  a  level  of  abstraction  which  generates  the  distinctions  found  in  (1-3). 
Sometimes these dualisms can be established for heuristic reasons, i.e. in order to develop   8 
a position. In other cases, they serve a rhetorical purpose, i.e. they are used in persuasion. 
Therefore, it is not claimed that if a dualism is identified, it must be rhetorical (or some 
variant of that). This allows us to define rhetorical dualism as 5) the use of (1-4) for three 
purposes:  a)  the  creation  of  opposites,  to  the  benefit  of  one  of  the  opposites;  b)  the 
creation of opposites to establish one of the opposites as a new, innovative position; c) 
the  creation  of opposites  in  order  to  make  space  in the  middle for  a  compromise  or 
synthetic position.  
 
Identifying rhetorical dualism is a three-stage process: identify the dualism present in a 
distinction (either dualism1 or dualism2); then, identify whether the continuum has been 
set up as a split pole (and in the case of dualism2a, whether it was false); and identify a 
purpose for the dualism, usually for rhetorical reasons. That is how the concept will be 
defined for the rest of the paper. Of course, it is difficult to show a rhetorical purpose and 
intent. One objection to this from the perspective of the rhetoric literature is that the act 
of creating false poles may be considered lying and that this is contrary to Sprachethik. 
That  is  not  to  say  that  such  manoeuvres  do  not  happen,  but  that  attaching  the  label 
‘rhetorical’  to  it,  and  thereby  associating  it  with  McCloskey  (et  al)’s  work  is 
inappropriate. A further objection is that the creation of the false pole (or even the pole 
believed to be true) could be heuristic, i.e., a stage in thought, a proposition, a temporary 
point in the development of an argument. In either case – the rhetorical and heuristic – it 
suggests  that  the  dualism  is  intentional.  Again,  we  should  note  that  for  McCloskey, 
rhetoric is speech with intent. A weaker version of rhetorical dualism is one in which 
even if rhetorical intent is not provable, rhetorical gain can be demonstrated. 
 
Rhetorical dualism is problematic for several reasons, including those general objections 
to  dualism  made  by  Dow  (passim).  Dow  emphasises  what  might  be  called  the  path 
dependency  of  investigation,  and  the  (usually  negative)  effect  of  dualism  on  that 
investigation. Dualism serves to fix categories, to categorise things incorrectly, and most 
significantly, to fix the path of the investigation, directing it along incorrect routes and 
excluding  the  more  fruitful.  Also,  these  types  of  dualism  can  lead  the  researcher  to 
misjudge their target and therefore to embrace imbalanced theories. Also, drawing on 
McCloskey's approach, rhetorical dualism can reduce the quality of a conversation, by 
making it more difficult for two sides to communicate with each other, by creating strict, 
irreconcilable  categories.  In  some  cases,  admittedly,  the  rhetorical  dualism  may  be 
intended  to  end  the  conversation.  For  example,  accusing  one's  opponent  of  being 
unscientific is a way of ending a conversation prematurely. 
 
A defence of (rhetorical) dualism might be that to focus on oppositions is the basis of 
dialectical thought. Dow acknowledges this possibility in showing how (what is 
commonly described as Hegelian) dialectical logic does not commit dualism because a) 
there is a necessary relation between the categories, b) the categorisation is temporary 
and c) new synthetic categories are created which replace the original categories. It is 
significant that many so-called heterodox economists embrace such a logic, for example 
through Marx or Dewey: McCloskey is an example of the latter. However, even if the 
intention of the theorist is to think dialectically, many such thought processes result in 
dualisms2. Also, it might be claimed that oppositions need to be created if new positions   9 
are to be created. However, thinking dialectically does not license knowingly false 
categories. Hegel was clear that he believed that the dialectic was the correct way to think 
about the world because the world operated dialectically. Thus, Hegel demanded an 
ontological licence as Dow does: a mere appeal to dialectic does not licence departures 
from reality which are known to be false. 
 
3. Case studies in rhetorical dualism 
 
3.1 Overview  
 
A  brief  treatment  seems  sufficient  to  make  the  suggestion  that  rhetorical  dualism  is 
commonplace in economics. In general, what is suggested is that there is a (possibly 
considerable) number of cases in the history of economic thought in which duals have 
been created for rhetorical reasons, such as to portray an opponent as extremist, or to 
portray existing literature as being clustered around two extremes, in order to cast one’s 
own  work  as  capturing  the  middle  ground.  Famously,  Keynes  (1936)  constructed  a 
category of the ‘classical’ as anything preceding (and therefore fundamentally separate 
from) his own work. Likewise, when Friedman (1953) argues that because models are 
necessarily unrealistic, therefore the realism of assumptions is irrelevant, he is making an 
argument which leaps from one end of a rhetorical dual to another. When Finn (2003) 
talks of the debate over markets being conducted in terms of force of argument about 
‘capitalism’ and ‘socialism’, he is talking about rhetorical dualism.  
 
Feminist economics has done a considerable amount of work in identifying dualisms, 
which are rhetorical and have oppressive effects on women in particular. They identify 
series  of  dualisms  in  the  language  of  economics  which  they  argue  reflects  a 
masculine/feminine distinction, to the disadvantage of the latter (see for example, Kuiper, 
2001; Folbre, 1993; Nelson, 1992, 1995). Similarly, as elaborated below, McCloskey 
(passim)  identifies  a  series  of  rhetorical  dualisms.  However,  these  accounts  do  not 
attempt to generalise, or place the rhetorical moves in a logical framework of dualism. 
This paper does so.  
 
3.2 Keynesians and Monetarists 
 
A  further  example  of  rhetorical  dualism  is  the  debate  between  Monetarists  and 
Keynesians which took place during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Harry Johnson (1971) 
gave  an  early  commentary  on  the  dispute.  It  is  a  case  study  on  rhetorical  dualism. 
Johnson  shows  how  both  the  ‘Keynesian’  revolution  and  the  Monetarist  counter-
revolution  used  rhetorical  and  dualistic  devices  to  attack  the  prevailing  orthodoxies, 
which  were  neo-classical  and  ‘Keynesian’  economics  respectively.  Theorists  on  both 
sides of the debate created homogeneous, over-simplified (i.e., dualist2) and even false 
(dualist2a) definitions of their opponents. This had two strategic benefits for theorists: 
first, it created an intellectual environment more favourable to their views; and second, 
by  portraying  opponents  as  extremist,  the  theorists  created  more  space  in  that 
environment in which they could operate. Johnson (3) makes the important claim that it is 
part of the nature of an orthodoxy “to reduce the subtle and sophisticated thoughts of   10 
great men [sic] to a set of simple principles and straightforward slogans…” This suggests 
that some form of dualism2 is inevitable; but Johnson shows how protagonists attempted 
to exploit this opportunity.   
 
For  instance,  Johnson  (1971:  4)  argues  that  both  groups  developed  apparently  new 
concepts, but in fact gave “old concepts new and confusing names” in order to create the 
impression of being radical and different: Johnson gives the example of the marginal 
productivity of capital becoming (he claims) the marginal efficiency of capital. Thus, he 
claims that scholars on both sides of the debate tended to claim to reject certain ideas, 
while in fact positing new names for the ideas they claimed to reject. That is, they refused 
to acknowledge the content of the previous orthodoxy (which they were attempting to 
overthrow) in their ‘new’ theories. This is rhetorical dualism2, for three reasons: first, 
Johnson argues (passim) that in fact the ‘Keynesian’ and Monetarist positions are at least 
partially  internally  related; second,  both  the  internal relationality  and  the  overlapping 
segments of the two main categories are denied by the theorists involved; and third, it is 
highly suggestive that this denial is made for rhetorical reasons.   
 
Johnson  (1971:  8) also notes  that  the  Monetarists  ignored the  varieties  of  Keynesian 
positions  on the  neutrality of  money  supply  and  that  “this  difference  was easily  and 
conveniently blurred, to the benefit of the counter-revolution, by seizing on the extreme 
Keynesian  position  that  money  does  not  matter  at  all  as  the  prevailing  orthodoxy” 
(emphasis added). Moreover, Johnson (10) argues, the Monetarist claim that the new 
quantity theory was validated by the discovery of a stable demand for money function 
was “justified only by the identification of the Keynesian orthodoxy with the proposition 
that  money  does  not  matter  and  that  velocity  is  either  highly  unstable  or  infinitely 
interest-inelastic”. These are both examples of dualism2. Finally, Johnson (11) claims that 
“[t]he  Keynesian  revolution  derived  a  large  part  of  its  intellectual  appeal  from  the 
deliberate  caricaturing  and  denigration  of  honest  and  humble  scholars”  (emphasis 
added): this clearly suggests rhetorical dualism2a.   
 
3. 3 McCloskey on rhetorical dualism 
 
McCloskey (1998) without using the terminology, shares much of Dow’s concern about 
dualistic distinctions in economics. She is more explicit in her arguments against de facto 
rhetorical dualism than Johnson. She argues that there is a rhetoric of distinction within 
economics.  In  particular,  McCloskey  attacks  the  distinctions  [rhetorical  dualisms]  of 
content/style, substance/rhetoric and science/literature (see particularly, 1998: ch. 2). For 
McCloskey, the way the economics is written as important as the argument itself; indeed, 
the style and content are inseparable. If all writing has an implicit desire to persuade, then 
the persuasiveness of the language used is not “mere” rhetoric and is not garnish on the 
substance of the argument; rather it is as important and inseparable from the argument. 
Morgan (2001) echoes this argument to claim that economic models are inseparable from 
the stories they are used to tell. Similarly, McCloskey holds that economic “science is a 
collection  of  literary  forms,  not  a  Science  [and  accordingly,  that]  literary  forms  are 
scientific” (McCloskey, 1998: 21). For example, economics is a form of poetry (12, 47). 
An  extension  of  this  argument  is  her  claim  that  the  distinction  between  science  and   11 
aesthetics  breaks  down,  because  positivists  appeal  to  virtues  such  as  simplicity  and 
beauty  in  their  arguments  (see,  for  example,  Debreu,  1984;  and  Russell’s  (1953) 
description  of  mathematics).  The  capitalisation  of  ‘science’  signifies  that  McCloskey 
wishes to change the definition of science from the modernist, positivist one to a more 
flexible  definition,  one  which  stresses  systematicity  (McCloskey:  20)  but  allows  a 
broader range of techniques and types of enquiry to be acknowledged as valid than is 
currently the case. In many ways, this process exemplifies Dow’s preference: McCloskey 
wants to reject an existing distinction and to in fact change the definition of the categories 
to  reflect  dynamic  interaction  between  them:  specifically,  from  Science/literature  we 
move to a definition of science which stresses its literary aspects. McCloskey is therefore 
challenging  further  duals,  such  as  Science/science  (19),  social  knowledge/objective 
scientific  knowledge  (108),  science/religion  (173),  scientific/humanistic  (177)  and 
quantitative=science/qualitative=non-science (20). Many of the same themes are present 
in McCloskey (1994). 
 
This  pattern  of  transcending  dualisms  is  repeated  throughout  McCloskey’s  work.  In 
McCloskey (1998), in addition to those discussed above, she challenges a range of other 
dualisms:  economical/uneconomical  (as  in  Posner,  1972;  3),  metaphor/reality  (12), 
evidence/reason (19), theory/experience (31), and official rhetoric/actual rhetoric (37 et 
passim). McCloskey (16) cites a passage by Mitchell (quoted in Rossetti, 1992: 220) in 
which  a  number  of  hierarchical  dualisms  are  used  or  which  McCloskey  imputes: 
“thought/wishing,…,  sciences/mere  humanities,…,  study/beach  reading,…, 
view/grounded  conviction”  and  challenges  them.  Later,  she  quotes  another  series  of 
duals,  in  the  context  of  the  demarcation  problem,  including:-  fact/value, 
objective/subjective,  positive/normative,  rigorous/intuitive,  precise/vague, 
cognition/feeling,  hard/soft.  It  is  clear  that  challenging  these  duals  also  implies 
challenging positivism. Of course, such a challenge is not neutral. McCloskey clearly 
favours the pragmatist philosophy and wants to attack positivism in order to advance her 
preferred alternative. She explicitly challenges the distinction between pragmatism and 
science  which  is  sometimes  drawn  (5).  She  also  questions  the  dualisms  of 
correct/incorrect and true/false (passim), and criticises the notion of Truth. It is necessary 
to attack positivism to establish pragmatism. In so doing, it is rhetorically advantageous 
to create the stress the flaws in the opponent. Part of this is to stress the divisive nature of 
the opponent, and the fractured nature of debate it creates. McCloskey’s own arguments 
are served by highlighting and criticising a series of dualisms2.  
 
4. Illustration: Orthodox and heterodox economists  
 
The  previous  sections  and  the  literature  cited  therein  hopefully  have  established  the 
argument  that  rhetorical  dualism  is  a  common  technique  in  economics.  It  forms  an 
important part of the conscious and intended, as well as unconscious and unintended, 
sub-text of economic discourse. I have also tried to argue that rhetorical dualism can be 
problematic. A common theme of the case studies above has been that rhetorical dualism 
is likely to hinder pluralism. Monetarists and Keynesians each got wrapped up in trying 
to prove the other wrong, that perhaps fruitful lines of synthesis were missed
5. Further, 
                                                 
5 For example, the effort spent on swathes of empirical macroeconomic work in the 1970s and 1980s on   12 
the tenor of the debate would mean that the post-battle environment would be difficult for 
the losers. That has proved to be the case for ‘heterodox’ theorists. 
 
Garnett (2005) provides an excellent commentary on the term ‘heterodox’ and the related 
debate on ‘pluralism’. This section will attempt to translate his and other accounts in 
terms  of  rhetorical  dualism.  Colander,  Holt  and  Rosser  (2004b)  claim  that  what  is 
effectively rhetorical dualism has dominated the orthodox/heterodox relationship for a 
long  time:  in  both  Marx’s  attack  on  ‘classical  economics’  (juxtaposed  with  ‘vulgar’ 
economy) and Veblen’s (1900) use of the term ‘neo-classical’ to disparage mainstream 
economics (and we could add, Keynes’ (1936) attack on ‘classical’ theory), they claim 
that “in each case the classification was made by an economist to create a better target for 
his criticism” (491)
6. Garnett identifies several strands of argument in ‘heterodox’ circles. 
Heterodox arguments are usually self-identified, although some who argue for schools of 
thought  reject  the  heterodox  nomenclature.  Garnett  argues  effectively  that  thought  in 
terms of a heterodoxy is dualist; and that this dualism is a rhetorical strategic response to 
the perception of orthodox economics as monistic and intolerant.  
 
The basic form of the dualism is straightforward. Substitute orthodox and heterodox for 
X and Y in figure 1 and that represents the situation quite well. A common feature in all 
the treatments is that there is a strict split between orthodox and heterodox on some basis. 
It is usually theoretical but recently it has been increasingly ontological. That will be 
discussed further below. First, however, we should discuss some subtle differences in the 
treatments  of  the  orthodox/heterodox  dualism  in  the  literature.  We  can  identify  four 
variants on the basic orthodox/heterodox dualism. First, as identified by Davis (2007) and 
Sent  (2003),  there  is  a  model  of  ‘half-pluralism’;  i.e.,  heterodox  economists  firstly 
identify  orthodoxy,  as  a  monolith,  then  identify  heterodoxy,  then  acknowledge  the 
pluralism amongst the heterodoxy. There may even be dialogue between the heterodox 
groups. Fundamentally, the different heterodox groups are allowed to co-exist. Second, is 
a less pluralistic model, wherein orthodoxy and heterodoxy are identified, then groups 
within heterodoxy are identified, but where this is merely a temporary stage. The ultimate 
goal is to create a single heterodox theory but as a synthesis of heterodox strands. This 
can  be  associated  with  work  by  Sawyer  (1989),  Sherman  (1987)  on  radical  political 
economy, and Lavoie’s attempt to create a post-classical synthesis. Arestis (1992) is a 
slight variant, in which he attempts to graft other heterodox elements onto (an already 
broadened) Post Keynesianism; the result would be a Post Keynesianism which would 
represent the heterodoxy. Dugger’s (1989) work is a similar attempt to create radical 
Institutionalism.  Third,  a  stronger  version  of  Arestis’  and  Dugger’s  model,  is  the 
approach taken by, for example, Paul Davidson, in which it is argued again that there 
needs to be a single heterodox approach, but that this should be squarely based on one 
(usually existing) heterodox perspective. In Davidson’s case, that would be a particular 
Post  Keynesian  reading  of  Keynes.  The  result  would  be  an  axiomatic  system  more 
                                                                                                                                                 
how agents would react to an exogenously imposed money supply shock might have been saved had the 
heterodox recognition of an endogenous money stock been heeded. 
6 Colander (2000) also claims that the term neo-classical is over-used, particularly by heterodox 
economists, to describe current mainstream economics, when, he argues, mainstream economics is not neo-
classical.     13 
general than the orthodox special case. In all three cases, the purpose is clearly to attack 
the  orthodoxy.  A  fourth  case  is  a  conciliatory  version  of  Davidson’s  argument:  that 
heterodox economists must engage in debate and exchange with the orthodoxy, with the 
possibility that there might be mutual fruitful exchange of ideas. This fourth position is 
significant, because often the position taken up by heterodox economists is simply to 
ignore  the  orthodoxy,  and  to  regard  them  as  worthless  or  incapable  of  reasonable 
dialogue (see Lee and Keen, 2004; Fleetwood, 2002). Support for this is provided by 
Howells’  (forthcoming)  account  of  the  development  of  the  so-called  ‘new  consensus 
macroeconomics’ in which the obvious Post Keynesian influences and work have been 
written out of the mainstream description of the model. 
 
A fifth variant, which has been popular in recent years, has been to advocate a line of 
distinction along metatheoretical lines. That partly reflects that no such distinction can be 
constructed  at  the  theoretical  level.  Davis  (2007)  regards  the  heterodox  alliances 
developed so far as unhelpful and ad hoc. He argues that a distinction can be identified 
between orthodox and heterodox such that orthodox economists have three core beliefs: 
individualism, rationality and equilibrium. Potts (2000) claims that all heterodox theory 
rejects the ontology of integral space (a field) which is held by orthodoxy. Lawson (2006) 
argues that heterodoxy is distinguished by an orientation to ontology. Lawson (1997) 
argues that heterodoxy can be identified as advocating depth realism and open systems. 
Dow  (2000)  similarly  argues  that  heterodox  views  share  a  belief  in  open  systems 
(although the concept may mean different things to different groups!). Lawson (2003, 
2006)  has  also argued  that  the  orthodoxy  is  identified  with  an  orientation  in  method 
toward an insistence on a mathematical-deductivism. In spite of their attack on dualism, 
Colander, et al (2004b) admit that there may be an orthodoxy in terms of the methods 
required to be used (i.e., economic modelling). In all of these accounts, a dualism has 
been created not at the level of theory, but at a different, essential level. Examples from 
the  orthodox  side  of  the  dualism  could  also  be  presented.  Lawson  (2006:  489)  cites 
Lipsey (2001) as one who has complained about the modelling impetus of the orthodoxy 
from within. 
 
There appears to be evidence of dualistic distinctions between orthodox and heterodox. 
These distinctions are mostly metatheoretical and although in some cases are related, are 
different. That observations raises several questions: 1) are the dualities rhetorical? 2) 
whether or not they are rhetorical, are they harmful? Turning to the first question, first the 
difficulty of the question should be acknowledged, because of the nature of rhetorical 
dualism. There are several possibilities: 1) the duality could be rhetorical: created in order 
to attack the orthodoxy more effectively, to instil a combative force in participants, to 
argue that the orthodoxy are incapable of open debate, or to encourage the formation of 
anti-orthodox alliances. 2) The duality could be based on essential difference between 
orthodox and heterodox. 3) The duality could be heuristic (which could also reflect (2)). 
4) The duality could capture both (1) and (2): the essential difference between the two 
bodies of thought could be identified, for instance at some level of abstraction; but this 
choice may be rhetorical. In cases (1) and (4), of course, the proof of rhetorical intent is 
difficult  to  show.  The  issue  also  remains  of  how  the  duality  is  used  and  whether  it 
remains in tact.    14 
 
As  an  illustration,  let  us  take  the  example  of  Lawson’s  (2006)  argument  about 
methodology, heterodoxy and ontology. Lawson attempts to identify a heterodox project. 
That would seem to suggest a duality. He is clear (483-4) that he does not intend to reify 
it  and  recognises  its  dynamic  nature.  Lawson  acknowledges  that  heterodoxy  is  an 
umbrella  term  covering  several  separate  traditions.  However,  in  the  course  of  his 
investigation, as  he  acknowledges,  Lawson  attempts to  establish  a  common  basis  for 
heterodoxy  and  in  so  doing  define  the  orthodoxy  or  “the  mainstream  against  which 
[heterodoxy] stands opposed” (484). That suggests dualistic language. Lawson takes the 
position that it is difficult to define heterodoxy in terms of theory, except by citing a 
rejection of the orthodoxy. He regards that as unsatisfactory as a definition of heterodoxy. 
Partly that is the case because of the problem of defining orthodox or mainstream (the 
terms are used interchangeably)
7 economics. Lawson rejects the definition of mainstream 
as individuality plus rationality (or those plus equilibrium), because he cites Marxists 
who share those concepts and because he argues that there are mainstream economists 
who do not hold them all. Rather, Lawson claims that the mainstream is identifiable via a 
feature which (he claims) remained constant while other aspects of theory or method, i.e., 
an inclination to mathematise. Lawson marshals evidence to support this thesis, mainly 
taken from the work of prominent economists.  Lawson then  argues that if heterodox 
economics  is  (by  definition)  the  rejection  of  the  mainstream,  then  it  must  reject  the 
insistence on mathematical modelling. 
 
This type of argument resonates with those made by Lawson for many years; of course, it 
is also a modification. Lawson, and more strongly, those influenced by him, seemed to be 
arguing  against  mathematical  and  statistical  methods  per  se,  except  under  specific 
conditions  (see  Downward  and  Mearman,  2002)  for  a  counter-argument.  Lawson’s 
modification is the insertion of the concept of insistence of mathematics, which leaves the 
door open to heterodox economists to use those methods. The argument remains striking, 
however, as it is simple and reinforces a simple dualistic distinction, based on rejection. 
The distinction also serves a rhetorical purpose for Lawson, who has consistently argued 
against  mathematical  methods,  as  discussed.  The  fact  that  Lawson  has  marshalled 
evidence  to  demonstrate  a  difference  suggests  that  perhaps  the  duality  is  not  merely 
rhetorical; but to argue that it is the difference is a stronger claim, has stronger rhetorical 
force and requires more evidence. Lawson attempts to bolster the claim by saying that 
heterodoxy  is  further  distinguished  by  an  attention  to  ontology.  He  then  identifies 
features of ontology which he claims are common to orthodox treatments. In contrast, he 
identifies elements of social reality, such as emergence, interconnectedness and structure, 
which he claims are held by heterodox economists. It is far beyond the scope of this 
paper to evaluate Lawson’s claim, however criticisms such as Fine’s (2006) suggest that 
the categories are too abstract and insufficiently linked to contemporary capitalism for 
them to be useful and to provide the basis for heterodox positions.  
 
Thus  far,  the  impression  is  that  Lawson  has  set  up  a  dualistic  distinction  between 
orthodox  and  heterodox  based  on  ontology.  This  claim  is  a  large  one  to  make.  The 
question is whether the distinction is as it appears to be, and what purpose it serves. 
                                                 
7 Lawson (2006: 491) rejects the term ‘neo-classical economics’ as misleading.    15 
Clearly,  it  serves  a  powerful  rhetorical  purpose,  partly  because  it  bolsters  arguments 
made  previously  by  Lawson.  Second,  the  distinction  is  subtle,  particularly  when 
compared with a position of ‘no econometrics to be used’. Also, it should be said that 
having established that definition of heterodoxy, Lawson later moves to a subtler position 
in  which  differences  between  heterodoxy  are  maintained,  in  terms  of  the  substantive 
issues they focus on. In other words, heterodox traditions represent a division of labour 
within economics (just as economics is itself part of a division of labour within social 
science). That thesis was advanced in Lawson (2003).  
 
This leads us to the second question, of whether the dualism of orthodox/heterodox is 
harmful. So far, the dualism and its associated fault line remains firmly in place. It is 
possible to cross it, but usually for purposes of attack. Garnett (2005), borrowing from 
Fuller (2000) and Fullbrook (2001), argues that the work of Kuhn (1962) is responsible 
for much of this dualism, because of its underlying Cold War thought pattern, which 
encouraged  an  ‘Us  versus  Them’  outlook,  and  a  tendency  to  view  the  other  as 
untouchable  and  incapable  of  reasonable  dialogue.  Differences  between  paradigms 
became extremely hard, and rather than promoting pluralism – in the sense of a tolerance 
and appreciation of other views and the ability to distinguish between different elements 
of other views – paradigms weaken it. Instead, the form of pluralism we get is more like 
that shown in figure 3 above.  
 
Second, a simple heterodox/orthodox dual is flawed because it may ignore the diversity 
on both sides of the divide. Colander, et al (2004b), who discuss the fragmentation of 
orthodoxy, claim that the term orthodoxy is backward-looking, and is largely unrelated to 
the current state of mainstream economics, much of which may be ripe for potentially 
fruitful dialogue. Dualism is also potentially self-destructive in that it discourages open-
mindedness (except to other heterodox views and perhaps view from outside economics), 
encourages defensiveness (Rutherford, 2000), can perpetuate isolation (Potts, 2000) and 
negativism. It may also be that the strategy of disengagement with orthodoxy is self-
reinforcing; however, it is clear that there are elements and structures of orthodoxy which 
are  aggressively  monistic  which  preclude  engagement  on  equal  (or  something 
approaching equal) terms; Colander, et al claim that often is those furthest away from 
new research (and perhaps instead with responsibility for management or undergraduate 
teaching) who are the most defensive.  
 
In  this  light,  Dow’s  contribution  to  the  debate  is  particularly  helpful.  She  argues 
persuasively that the ontological and epistemological grounds for adopting strict dualisms 
is usually absent. She also argues for a genuine pluralism. However, contra Garnett’s 
(2005) position on Kuhn, Dow argues that a modification of Kuhn is possible which 
allows  a  role  for  schools  of  thought,  but  without  the  intolerance.  Her  concept  of 
‘structured  pluralism’  envisages  schools  of  thought  as  open  systems.  They  have 
boundaries, but these boundaries are permeable, allowing ideas from elsewhere to affect 
them.  In that way, ideas can even cross the orthodox/heterodox divide (wherever the 
dividing line is placed) and indeed, no divide is necessary. However, Dow’s schema does 
not collapse into postmodernist eclecticism: there remains structure, both within each   16 
school  of  thought,  but  across  the  spectrum  of  perspectives.  Further,  it  is  held  that 
definitions be flexible enough that the fixed pluralism of figure 3 is also avoided.  
 
That temporal element is particularly significant. One of the original elements of Dow’s 
definition of dualism is that the categories are fixed. Categorisation is necessary, but one 
of the arguments against dualism is that categories, once chosen, are fixed, creating a 
path dependence. Some path dependence is inevitable; however, the question is to what 
extent  the  path  dependence  occurs  and  whether  that  is  acceptable.  It  is  possible  to 
construct  dualistic  distinctions  between  something  called  orthodox  and  an  opponent 
called heterodox but is it helpful? Which distinction is the most useful is a question of 
explanatory power. In any case, though, the dualism may end up being reified, trapping 
subsequent  researchers  into  thinking  in  terms  of  it,  perhaps  missing  valuable 




This paper has discussed rhetorical dualism, i.e. the use of dualisms (of various types) for 
rhetorical purposes. It synthesises elements of Dow and McCloskey’s approaches and 
builds on both and on feminism. The paper formalises the notion of rhetorical dualism 
implicit in the earlier literature. It has been suggested that rhetorical dualism is common 
in economics; this is not surprising, given that it is common in life. The debate between 
Monetarists and Keynesians is shown to display rhetorical dualism.  
 
Overall, dualism is a tendency in thought: it could be Cartesian, could be Hegelian but 
those cases are different. Dualism in the Cartesian sense is particularly problematic; but 
even in the Hegelian sense it could be too. Rhetoric has been an influential literature in 
economics. McCloskey has highlighted specific cases of rhetorical dualism: dualities 
created for rhetorical purposes. In McCloskey, it is possible that rhetoric encompasses all 
speech and writing; however, that is unclear. Thus, all dualities can be examined as to 
whether they are designed for rhetoric. They may not be: they may be heuristic and they 
may represent accurately concrete entities. Dualities may meet multiple criteria: they may 
be heuristic and real; or rhetorical and real. Showing rhetorical dualism is difficult 
because it requires showing purpose and intent. That is difficult. However, there does 
seem to be evidence that many of the dualities present in economics (and there are many) 
are rhetorical. There seems to be a tendency to rhetorical dualism in economics.  
 
One possible example is the distinction between orthodox and heterodox. There are many 
examples of that distinction, most often now at a metatheoretical level. These distinctions 
are possible examples of rhetorical dualism. Again, though that is difficult to prove. At 
this stage, the dualities are entities to explain. They may be heuristic and they may have 
some real basis; but again they involve choices of levels of abstraction which create the 
dualities. Why this occurs also needs to be explained. One explanation is that they serve a 
rhetorical purpose.  
 
Whether or not the orthodox/heterodox dualities are rhetorical, they may be problematic. 
If they are Hegelian, this is less likely to be the case, but even in that case, the duality   17 
may create barriers to conversation and thought, partly through path dependence of 
debate. If the categories become reified this is problematic. This is particularly the case 
with respect to orthodox/heterodox, because heterodox can be defined simply in terms of 
orthodoxy and its positive, constructive elements are ignored. Further, it may be that the 
dualities are unfounded in reality, and that they could be misleading in other ways. It is 
likely that it is possible to create a series of dualistic distinctions between orthodox and 
heterodox, but to focus on one may be unhelpful. Also, in the light of the obvious 
diversity within ‘orthodoxy’ and ‘heterodoxy’, the distinction may be misleading and 
inaccurate. The orthodox/heterodox distinction may have some value in clarifying some 
issues in economics, but it is likely that it is more problematic than helpful.    18 
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